30 Sep·2 min read

Anthropic says GLM-5.3 is the best open model at hacking so far

Anthropic's report shows Zhipu's open-weight GLM-5.3 building a working Chrome exploit for $20.40 in API costs.

A researcher working with Anthropic used GLM-5.3-Flash to build a working exploit for a known Chrome bug, and it cost $20.40 at Zhipu's API prices. The human put in about 20 minutes. The model did the rest over roughly eight hours, including an ARM64 exploit chain that gets around Chrome's pointer authentication hardening.

That's one result from a report Anthropic published on September 29 about GLM-5.3, the latest open-weight model from Zhipu. Anthropic calls it the most cyber-capable open model so far. On ExploitBench, a set of Chrome V8 vulnerabilities, it built end-to-end exploits in 50 of 410 attempts. Anthropic's own Claude Mythos Preview managed 56. Other open models they tested, Kimi K3, DeepSeek V4.1-Flash and the previous GLM-5.2, scored close to zero.

The safety side is where the report gets pointed. Ask GLM-5.3 plainly for help with an attack and it refuses every time. Tell it you're on a red team doing authorised testing and it goes along with it 64% of the time. Prefill its reasoning and that goes to 92%. Abliterate it, which means finding the part of the model that handles refusals and cutting it out, and it helps 100% of the time. Anthropic estimates abliteration takes about 600 GPU hours, around $1,200, and drops the refusal rate from 95% to about 6% with almost no loss in capability. Once the weights are public, anyone with that budget can do it, and nobody can take it back.

The reaction on Hacker News and r/LocalLLaMA mostly went the other way from what Anthropic probably intended. A lot of people read it as an ad. A Chinese open model sitting a few months behind the frontier, doing exploit work that closed models won't touch, for twenty dollars. One commenter said Anthropic did better marketing for open models than their own developers ever have. Others read it as Anthropic laying the groundwork for a ban on open weights, and the timing doesn't help, since people are already worried about restrictions on Chinese open models.

Security people had a more practical complaint. Claude refuses a lot of legitimate defensive work, and several of them said GLM was the model that actually did the reverse engineering when they needed it.

I think both things are true. The numbers in the report are real, and a cheap exploit pipeline anyone can download is a real problem. But Anthropic is also a company with a direct interest in open models looking dangerous, and it's hard to publish this report without it reading as a pitch for regulation. The capability is already out there. What's left to argue about is who gets to use it and who gets to decide.